In “Fair weather and foul” my final sentence was : “It was envisaged that Vol. 2 (“The Royal Ceylon Navy”) and Volume 3 onwards(“The Sri Lanka Navy”) would be written in due course.” This pious hope could not be realized and I describe the events in “The Pictorial History: the consolation prize”. The text I had written, covering the period 1937-2000 was withdrawn by me, allowing the Pictorial History to take its place. This text remained with me, collecting dust, till I realized that it could become the projected Volume 2 (“The Royal Ceylon Navy”). However it would extend only to the ‘70s, when I retired, and would leave out the period that I had no personal knowledge of and, of course, it would be written in a more academic style. The start was made but, because of my involvement with Maritime Archaeology and Sri Lankan Watercraft, it was not completed. However, as it seems a pity that the work does not see the light of day, I give excerpts from it, at length below. “Excerpts” : because I have deleted the section on the CRNVR as it has been published by the Navy, new Chapters not published included, as are some special items (some written for me by others). The scope of the book is, however, left intact, to show what was planned: sections highlighted in the Contents are omitted. Will someone take up the baton and carry it over the finish line? He has my blessings!
Envisaged title:
EMERGING NAVY, EMERGING NATION
The Navy in Sri Lanka: 1937-1976
This book is Dedicated to:
The men and women of our Navy,
Past, Present and yet to come.
PART 1
(Chapters shown in RED are not included as they have been previously published)
The Ceylon Naval Volunteer Force
and
The Ceylon Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve
1937 - 1950
CONTENTS
Chapter 1 Last days as a Colony: Ceylon in the 1930s
Chapter 2 Preparations for war
Appendix A: Insertion of officers’ names in the Navy List
Appendix B:The Susantha de Fonseka incident
Chapter 3 Naval activities during the war years: 1939-1946
(1) Mobilization, Organization, Duties
Appendix: List of officers who served in the CNVF/CRNVR
(2) Maritime Operations
Appendix A: Passage to Burma
Chapter 4 (3) Operations ashore
Chapter 5 (4) Encounters with the Enemy
Appendices A-M (Deleted here. See Navy Book)
Chapter 6 (5) Demobilization
Appendix: Visit of SACSEA (Deleted here. See Navy Book)
Chapter 7 Political developments in the war years
Chapter 8 Providing for the future: The “Nucleus” (1946-1950)
Chapter 9 The Nucleus: Duties and Activities (1946-1950)
Appendix A: The Cruise of the “Halpha”
Appendix B: The Victory Parade
Appendix C: Transfer of HMS Flying Fish to CRNVR
(All deleted here. See Navy Book)
Chapter 10 Final Analysis.
PART 2
THE ROYAL CEYLON NAVY
CONTENTS
Introduction
Chapter 1 The Nation: 1950-1956. The “Defence” parameter
Chapter 2 A Navy for the future
Chapter 3 Defining the Navy's Role
Appendix 1 - The Navy's First Operational Base
2 - "Vijaya" goes to Grimsby
Chapter 4 The Nation: 1956-1960. The “revolution” of 1956
Chapter 5 Expansion as a "Blue Water" Navy
Appendix 1 - Joint Exercises Trincomalee (JET)
Chapter 6 The Nation: 1960-1965. A coup d’etat and consequences
Chapter 7 The Navy Becalmed
Appendix 1 - The "Blue Water" Fleet: the Ships that sailed away
2 - Operation "Goshen"
Chapter 8 The Nation: 1965-1971. First steps to rehabilitation
Chapter 9 Small Ships and Big Ideas
Appendix 1 - Looking Back at UNIPOM
2 - The Naval Contribution to National Development
3 - Officer Cadet Training in the Navy
Chapter 10 The Nation: 1971. The end of innocence
Appendix 1 - A Handful of Mustard Seed
2 - Insurgency '71: Some Personal Experiences
PART 3
THE SRI LANKA NAVY
CONTENTS
Introduction
Chapter 1 The Nation: 1972. Republican status
Chapter 2 A Navy to Save Democracy: 1972-83
Appendix 1 - Circumnavigaton Under Sail
Appendix 2 - Maintenance of Lighthouses
Chapter 3 The Nation: 1977. Executive Presidency and Terrorism
Chapter 4 A Nation in conflict: 1983 and later
(1) Prelude: Early Confrontations
(2) Eelam War 1
(3) The Indian Interlude: IPKF
(4) Eelam War 2
(5) Peace talks
(6) Eelam War 3
(7) Cease Fire: CFA
(8) Failure and Escalation
(9) Prelude to Eelam War 4?
Chapter 5 The Navy at War again
Appendix 1 - Moments to Remember
Appendix 2 - Medals and Decorations
Appendix 3 - Operational and Administrative structures
Appendix 4 - The Fleet
Chapter 6 The Nation in the ’90: Human Rights and the Military
Chapter 7 A final analysis – the role of the Navy in the future.
**********************
Excerpts from PART 1
Chapter 1
CEYLON IN THE 1930s
A Navy created for Ceylon, and manned by people of the country, came into being in only 1937. Its creation had nothing to do with the wishes or needs of the people of Ceylon, but with those of Britain. The British perception was that there would be another war between a rampant Germany (Hitler’s) and the British Empire. Hence the planning and creation of the Navy were unrelated to any internal requirements of this country; the reasons are dealt with in the following chapter. It is therefore necessary that to provide the reader with, at least, a basic understanding of the politico-social context of the country in the 1930s.
Ceylon was, then, yet a Crown Colony, and not a part of British India which was ruled through its Viceroy. The Defence Forces of Ceylon were, therefore, part of the British Forces and not part of the Indian Army or the Royal Indian Navy. Ceylon had been a Crown Colony ruled by a Governor, appointed by the Secretary of State for Colonies, since 1802. For nearly 100 years, from the Colebrook-Cameron Reforms of 1833, the absolute power of the Governor (though not of the British government) had been diluted – in theory, if not in fact – by the establishment of a Council composed of Officials and a few unofficial members. The latter were largely urban, anglicized persons from various ethnic groups who, though being educated professional men of ability, had no power at all within the Council.
Over these near-100 years, the number of Unofficial Members in Council increased in number, though not in power. They were appointed – not elected – on the basis of education, profession and wealth. Around the turn of the century, some “Educated Ceylonese” were, for the first time, elected by an electorate comprised of their peers. (In the next chapter it will be seen that this criterion extended to even the selection of a certain class of sailor).The Empire intended to pass on more powers to this Legislative Council and indicated that self-government was a distinct possibility at some date to be decided on later. In the late 1920s, yet another Constitutional Commission was appointed but, by this time, several fissures had surfaced in the social fabric. One was the issue of class, which divided the English-educated “landed aristocracy” from the great majority of those who did not belong to these categories and who considered the privileged group as hangers-on of the British. The other issue, springing from the first, was the growth of nationalism led by ethnic and religious movements as a counter to the priviledged, and largely Christian, sector.
At the time the new Commission arrived, the Ceylonese were already divided on the bases of ethnicity (a heritage of 1833, yet alive today) and class (education, profession and wealth: a heritage of the “educated Ceylonese”). The Ceylon National Congress, modeled on the Indian National Congress, represented the latter, and a Tamil Congress and a Sinhala Maha Sabha represented the former. Even Sports Clubs were ethnic, as apparent by their names: the Sinhalese Sports Club, the Tamil Union, the Burgher Recreational Club and the Moors Sports Club, to name but a few. (There was also the Colombo Cricket Club for Europeans only). In contrast there were two political movements of a distinctly anti-establishment nature. One movement was the Labour Party (LP) modeled on the British party of that name, which organized the first successful industrial strike (at the Wellawatte Spinning Mills) in 1925. The other was a group of Marxist Parties, such as the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), a Trotskyite party which carried on an anti-war campaign in the 1930s and 1940s; the Ceylon Communist Party (CP) which adopted an anti-war stance till Soviet Russia joined the Allies; and the Ceylon Branch of the Bolshevik-Leninist Party of India (BLPI) which later merged with the LSSP.
The Donoughmore Commission came out to Ceylon in the wake of the acceptance of universal adult franchise in Britain. It included a Scottish peer, Sir Hugh Drummond-Shiels, who was keen to grant universal adult franchise to the Ceylonese, should they only ask for it: but none of the major parties did. Ultimately it was the lone voice of the small Labour Party that was seized upon as the proverbial straw by the Commission. Thus, in 1931, Ceylon found itself with a “State Council” with a majority of representatives (“Members of the State Council”, or M.S.C.) elected by universal adult franchise; a Board of Ministers with a Leader of the House; elected Speaker and Deputy Speaker; yet lacking power over Finance, Administration, Justice and Foreign Affairs, which were in the hands of the Governor’s Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary and Legal Secretary. The State Council remained in place till 1947.
Both de facto and de jure, Ceylon remained a Crown Colony, even though the State Council was a major step towards Dominion Status. Unfortunately, racial politics led to the Tamil cry for “50-50”, or parity of status between Sinhalese and Tamils. This was strongly objected to by the Sinhalese, and the other ethnic groups which, though represented in the State Council, were not included in this formula. The bulk of the people were more involved in this issue and showed no interest in war, Tthe LSSP even proposed a “Suriya Mal Campaign” to replace “Poppy Day” which it dismissed as an imperialist ploy. Thus there was no grass-roots call for the creation of a Navy in the 1930s. In fact there was – as was to be expected – an undertow of resentment against the British, our colonial masters.
It was in this socio-political context that Ceylon was called upon to raise a naval force. Once raised as a Volunteer Force in 1937 it continued in being and underwent changes - dictated by war and politics - till after Independence. The stages it progressed through were, in short:
|
1943 - 1946 |
CRNVR |
C-in-C, Ceylon |
Royal Navy |
Royal Navy |
Regular naval duties |
Under mobilization |
|
1946 - 1950 |
CVNF but using the name CRNVR |
Governor, later Governor-General |
State Council, and later Parliament
|
State Council, and later Parliament
|
Internal Security, Anti-smuggling & anti illicit immigration patrols |
A ‘Nucleus’ of 100 under mobilization |
|
1950 - |
R.Cy.N |
Governor-General |
Parliament |
Parliament |
Internal Security, Anti-smuggling & anti illicit immigration patrols |
A national Navy of Regulars, Regular Reservists, Volunteers and a Volunteer Naval Reserve |
This progression was marked by several Legislaative enactments, namely:
LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE NAVY IN CEYLON
(1) Colonial Naval Volunteer Ordinance, 1931 (Whitehall)
(2) Naval Volunteer Ordinance, No. 1 of 1937
(3) Emergency Powers Defence Acts, 1939-1950 (White hall?)
(4) The Ceylon Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (General Service) Ordinance, No. 44 of 1938.
(5) The Ceylon Naval Volunteer Force (Compulsory Leave) Ordinance, No.11 of 1946
(6) The Navy Act, No.34 of 1950.
Excerpts from PART 2 - Royal Ceylon Navy
CHAPTER 4
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NAVY
The Navy Act of 1950 only formalized an existing naval force into a proper Navy under government control. It did not create a Navy out of nothing nor does the history of the Navy begin with the Act. Already, nearly two years before the Act, Ceylon had progressed from Crown Colony to Dominion Status but remained part of the Commonwealth, accepting the representative of the British Crown as the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It was because of this that the Navy remained the “Royal Ceylon Navy”.
In 1972 a more radical change in the State took place, peacefully, with the nation assuming a Republican form of government. It still chose to voluntarily remain within the Commonwealth but recognize the Queen only as the Head of the Commonwealth. The Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was a President appointed by Parliament, which exercised sovereignty on behalf of the people. The name “Ceylon” was also dropped in favour of “Sri Lanka”. The Navy thus became the “Sri Lanka Navy” in 1972. A later amendment to the Republican constitution, whereby the President was not only Head of State but also the Chief Executive did not change the status of the Navy save for the fact that the Minister of Defence and the Commander-in-Chief became one and the same person. There had been some doubts whether the replacement of a ceremonial Governor-General by a ceremonial President in 1972 was meaningful, but two factors seem to have influenced the constitution-makers: the implication of the Governor-General in office in an attempted political “coup d'etat” and the Privy Council’s power to sit in judgment over the decisions of the Supreme Court of Ceylon. While the latter seemed to indicate that full Independence could not be said to have been achieved as long as a Court in Britain could rule on Ceylonese matters, the full implications of what a Governor-General could do, if he wished to exercise his powers, became apparent only in the 1980s when the Governor-General of Australia removed the democratically elected Prime Minister from office.
In this part of this narration no effort is made to distinguish the Royal Ceylon Navy from the Sri Lanka Navy as they were, in fact, not two entities, but one. A more meaningful yardstick is applied, namely, phases in the Navy’s development. Circumstances led to major changes in the Navy’s role, the composition of its Fleet and its cadre & complement, but these were largely dictated by non-naval factors, such as the policy of the government in power and terrorist activities. However, these changes, for better or for worse, did take place and the Navy of today is the end result of these changes, at least up to this point of time.
The development of the Navy from the Navy Act to date is presented in the following stages:
1950-1956 Defining a role
1956-1960 Expansion as a “Blue-water” Navy
1960-1966 The Navy Becalmed
1966-1971 Small ships and big ideas
1971-1983 A Navy to defend Democracy
1983-1990 Responding to Terrorism
1990 to date At war again
CHAPTER 5
1951 – 1956 – DEFINING THE NAVY’S ROLE
Evolution of a role
After the war years, the CRNVR had had some years of experience in a peacetime role and the experience gained during those years had now to be formalized and defined. Some of the traditional roles of a peacetime Navy had already been adopted and acted upon, such a s Aid to Civil Power, Port & Harbour services, Ceremonial duties, Security services, Maintainence of Public Utilities in emergencies, Coast guard & Customs functions and Flood Relief. The voyage to Burma, too, was to keep the White Ensign flying ("Showing the Flag"). Others roles, such as Fisheries Protection, Inland water transport, Hydrographic Survey, Air-sea rescue services and Troop transport, which had been envisaged in the days before demobilization, had not yet been taken in hand. Tasks were assumed as and when circumstances dictated. A role for the Navy thus grew around its existence rather than on paper. There was a Navy, and when its expertise was required, it was called upon to perform it. Budget allocations, cadre & complement, purchase of craft and equipment and technical support systems followed.
Command
Before the Navy Act was passed into law, Lt.Cdr. G.R.M. de Mel proceeded to England on a year’s training on 27th September, 1950. Capt. W.E.Banks, CBE, DSC, RN, who had previously been appointed Naval Advisor to the Government of Ceylon on 1st February, 1950, took over as C.O.CRNVR in addition and, with the passage of the Act, was appointed the first “Captain of the Navy”. During the period under review, the following served as Captains of the Navy:
Capt. W.E.Banks, CBE, DSC, RN 9.12.50 - 26.11.51
Capt. J.R.S.Brown, RN 27.11.21 - 14.6.53
Capt.(later Commodore)P.M.B.Chavasse,DSC,RN 15.6.53 - 11.7.55
Capt.(later Rear Adm.)G.R.M.de Mel, OBE,RCyN 12.7.55
Capt.W.G.Beauchamp was given a ceremonial farewell party on 4th May, 1951.
On 7th January, 1952, the first Board Meeting of the Royal Ceylon Navy was held. Present were the Captain of the Navy (Capt.Brown), Chief of Staff (Cdr. De Mel), Staff Officer, Plans (Lt.Cdr.Kadirgammar), Staff Officer, Training (Cdr.Ball) and Staff Supplies Officer (Lt.Cdr.Martinus).
In accordance with section 159 of the Navy Act, Trincomalee was declared a Naval Port and placed under the control of the Captain of the Navy. The RN base there, H.M.S. “Highflyer”, however, continued under RN command as did other British bases in Diyatalawa and Welisara, under a series of Defence Agreement signed between the governments of the two countries at the time Independence was granted. This was not a popular arrangement and was to lead to political dissent in the years to come.
Following the tradition in the U.K., the Navy was assumed to be the “Senior Service”, taking precedence over the other services, the Army and Air Force. However, during this formative period, a case had been made that this tradition need not be followed in Ceylon and, by Gazette Notification, the Army was accorded the position of the “Senior Service”.
Bases, ships & duties at sea
At the beginning of this period, the Navy’s presence on shore was limited to H.M.Cy.S “Gemunu 1”, the tender to Naval Headquarters, situated at Galle Buck, to which location the Barracks from Kochchikade moved in May, 1951. The Engineering workshop, Boom Defence Depot and Boatyard and the VNF facilities at Kochchikade was commissioned “Gemunu ll” with a separate Commanding Officer. A wardroom for Regular officers had been taken over in 1950: No.6, Flagstaff Street. The Auxillary Barracks were taken over from the P.W.D. on 15.2.52 and the buildings that were to house the Sick Quarters also taken over on 23.8.52. The same year, the Naval Sports Pavilion was constructed in the Navy Grounds at Galle Face.
The first requirement of space for expansion outside Colombo was for Training purposes. A training camp was set up in Diyatalawa: ‘Thistle’ camp which was taken over from the Air Force and four married quarters, also at the same camp, were subsequently taken over from the Army. It was commissioned shortly afterwards, on 28.8.51, as H.M.Cy.S. “Rangalla” with Lt.R.Proctor in command. There does not seem to have been a policy or plan for naming ships and establishments. The earliest shore establishments were named after their geographical locations, and is believed that “Rangalla” was a mis-spelling or mis-pronounciation of the name of a prominent hill, Rahangala, that overlooked the base. “Rangalla” was a recruit training centre essentially. It later shifted to more commodious quarters. Recruit intakes were small in number, though frequent: in 1951-52 the numbers under mobilization was 510 and in 1955-56 it was 771.
Very soon anti-smuggling and anti-illicit immigration became prime objectives of the Navy. Smuggling emerged as a problem as India and Ceylon were now independent of Britain and, hence, Customs barriers being set up on both sides of the Palk Strait. Illicit immigration resulted from South Indian estate workers who were repatriated to India, as they were now Indian citizens, who were trying to cross back to the comparative comfort of Ceylon where they had lived and worked many years. The Army was also manning coast watching points and the first operational base of the Navy was a former Army camp, at the mouth of a little river called Kal Aru, eight miles south of the nearest village, Silavatturai. This was manned by a naval detachment and consisted of three cadjan huts: one for officers and the armoury, one for sailors and one for a galley, all built upon a floor of sea sand. This detachment was commissioned H.M.Cy.S.“Kal Aru” on 20.5.53 under the command of Lt.P.D. Nathanielsz. Duties carried out were to patrol the beach north and south of the camp to keep a watch for craft trying to make for shore with contraband or illegal immigrants. On 8.10.53 the Navy moved to Talaimannar and “Kal Aru” was decommissioned. The new base, on the pier, had marginally better facilities, a railway carriage equipped with telegraphic and radio communication facilities serving as the first Operations Room. This base was also commissioned, as H.M.Cy.S.“Elara” also under the command of Lt.P.D.Nathanielsz. Coastal surveillance was yet the main operational function. Here, the Navy began to patrol coastal waters in craft lent by the Colombo Port Commission and the Fisheries Dept.: the “Lion”, “Halmessa”, “Thalapatha” and “Adi Sali”. Later, the Police launch “Kossa” joined the “fleet” as its “flagship”. With the acquisition of proper Patrol Craft, these were returned.
The Navy’s role in this operation was, of course, to be at sea as soon as it received its patrol craft. These soon began arriving: 2 Long Patrol Boats (LPB), hard chine and metal hulled, H.M.Cy.Ships “Hansaya” (Lt.M.Chanmugam) and “Lihiniya” (Lt.W.Dharmadasa) commissioned on 4.1.55; the Seaward Defence Boat (SDB) H.M.Cy.S. “Kotiya” commissioned on 8.5.55 (Lt.Cdr.A.M.Caldera); and the wooden hulled Short Patrol Boat (SPB) commissioned on 15.7.55 as H.M.Cy.S.“Seruwa” (Sub Lt.K.N.Jilla). With the arrival of the patrol craft, a better fitted-out base became necessary and a former RN Flying boat base at Karainagar was taken over on as an Advance Naval Base on 16.4.54. On 15.9.55 H.M.Cy.S.“Elara” was shifted there, and the Talaimannar base closed down. This first major operational base provided for a Commander, Northern Area and Cdr. R.Kadirgammar was appointed to this post on 15.5.55. Three more Short Patrol Boats were taken delivery of and commissioned: H.M.Cy.Ships “Diyakawa” (Commissioned Boatswain F.A.A.Serpancy), “Tarawa” (Commissioned Boatswain E.R.Christoffelsz) and “Korawakka” (Commissioned Boatswain A.A.H.Van Reyk). All the LPBs and SPBs were attached to “Elara” for operational duties. Powers under the Customs Ordinance were devolved on naval officers carrying out anti-smuggling duties and persons taken into custody under these powers were dealt with under that Ordinance.
Aid to Civil Power
Internal security continued to be a major task, with several politically significant events taking place which could, potentially – if not actually – cuase civil disturbance. These included the death of the Prime Minister D.S.Senanayake and uncertainity over sucession; the “Hartal” period of civil disturbance in 1953; followed by the resignation of Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake and his succession by Sir John Kotelawela; and the weakening of the governing party’s majority by the defection of the Leader of the House, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and some others. The cry for “Sinhala Only” began to be heard, as was a movement to give the Sinhala-Buddhist majority a greater share of power. The Navy was thus kept on its toes and called out to act in aid of civil power from time to time.
In keepting with the Navy’s commitment to safeguard all Port services, the VNF commissioned another Division, the Port Division, as H.M.Cy.S.“Tissa”. It comprised of essential officials of the Port Commission and was commanded by their senior-most member, Capt. M.Chandrasoma, OBE. This Division continued in existence till 31.8.56, when it was de-commissioned.
Ceremonial duties
Several significant ceremonial tasks were undertaken during this period. One of the first was the firing of 21-gun Salute to the Nation on the first Anniversary of Independence, when “Vijaya” had to cope, successfully, with the task of firing her single 4” gun without a mishap.
A solemn occasion was the funeral of the first Prime Minister, D.S.Senanayake, on 22nd March, 1952, when the Navy manned the rope for the “Ransivige” and provided pall-bearers and a contingent.
A more festive occasion was that of participation in the Coronation Celebrations of Queen Elizabeth II, which took place when “Vijaya” was in Grimsby for a major refit. She carried the Coronation contingent under Cdr.Murray and Lt.Cdr. Proctor, but was unable to take part in the Fleet Review at Portsmouth because she was in dry-dock. Instead, the RN lent a ship hastily commissioned “Vijaya II” so that the R.Cy.N. was also inspected by the Queen.
More important was Her Majesty’s visit to Ceylon in 1954 on board the Royal Yacht “Gothic”. “Vijaya”, which had returned after refit, steamed south of Colombo to rendevous with her and took over escort duties from the Australian and New Zealand ships three miles out of Colombo. The R.Cy.A.F. provided an air escort. She entered harbour ahead of the “Gothic” but remained in the stream while the Royal Yacth became the first ship to secure at, what was to be named, the Queen Elizabeth Quay. The Navy Paraded a Royal Guard on the pier and awaited the Queen. The Official Programme called for the Royal Standard be broken and a Royal Salute of 21 guns also to be fired as the Queen stepped ashore. Seeing her emerging, Commodore Chavasse gave the pre-arranged signal to break out the Royal Standard. Following this, the guns boomed out a Royal Salute and the Guard Presented Arms. The figure on the gangway stood at attention acknowledging the Salute but she was, alas! not the Queen, but her Lady-in-Waiting, Lady Pamela Mountbatten. (This error is said to have cost Cmdr. Chavasse his future promotions in the RN.) The Queen and Prince Phillip visited “Vijaya” and the latter was hosted to a dinner at the Wardroom.
H.R.H. Prince Phillip, the Duke of Edinburgh re-visited Ceylon the next year on board the Royal Yacht “Brittania” which was escorted by “Vijaya”. He was entertained by the Officers of the Armed Forces at the Navy Wardroom.
Visits abroad
The first cruise undertaken after the formation of the R.Cy.N. was when “Vijaya” paid a short visit to the Maldives with Sir John Kotelawala, Minister for Transport and Works and his party. This was in May, 1951.
The next year, “Vijaya” paid another call to participate in the Proclamation of the Maldivian Republic. Wtr. S.L.Fernando, President, Buddhist Association, presented the new President with a Buddhist Flag bearing the legend: “Presented by the Buddhists of the Royal Ceylon Navy to the President on the occasion of the Proclamation of the Maldivian Republic on January 1st, 1953.”
“Vijaya” sailed to England for a D/2 refit in 1953. The refit was carried out at Humber Graving Dock at Grimsby at an approximate cost of Pds.Stg. 1.6 million, or Rs. 25 m at 1953 conversion rates. The voyage, under the command of Lt.Cdr.Proctor, was an eventful one. The Coronation contingent also took passage. “Vijaya” was already in a sorry shape when she left harbour and worse after mis-handling in Bombay by the Harbour Pilot who overrated her capacity to answer the helm, presuming she was powered by steam turbines while she only had steam reciprocating engines. After emergency patching up, her next stop was at Port Said to pick up the (Egyptian) Pilot for the Suez canal and “Vijaya” was run aground there and damaged a propeller. After temporary repairs, the voyage continued with a noisy and defective properller. Stops at Malta and Gibraltar followed and, in the English Channel, “Vijaya” was fog-bound in a “pea souper” for 24 hours, when electrical failures led to the radar having to be turned by hand by a sailor atop the mast with a stop-watch in hand, wrapped up in blankets as they had no duffel coats. Contrary to the prophets of doom, she reached her destination safely, to banner rnewspaper headlines: “THE FLEET’S IN!”. (The R.Cy.N., then, gloried in the description of her as “The One-Ship Navy”).
“Vijaya” undertook her second visit to Burma in 1955, carrying a group of persons to participate in the “Chatta Sangayana”. 52 Buddhist Officers and sailors including CPO M.Peter Perera and P.O. (later Lt.(S)) I.C.Theswa, Patron and President, respectively, of the Naval Buddhist Association; 29 soldiers led by Major Sepala Attygalle and 7 Air Force personnel led by Flt.Lt. Paddy Mendis also took passage. The delegation was led by the Honorary Chaplain to the Forces, the Rev. Indiruwe Pannatissa. A gift of a sapling from the “Sri Maha Bodhiya” was carried as a gift to Burma. In return, the Burma Navy Buddhist Association presented a 5-ft. 1500 lb. statue of the Buddha and several other smaller statues. One of the smaller statues was later enshrined at the Tissa Viharaya in Trincomalee Dockyard. The large statue was kept for a while at the Mahabodhi Society premises and later, under the patronage of the Lanka Balamandalaya, installed at the Nagadvipa Temple. This was on 6.2.56 and the Commander, Northern Area, Cdr. Kadigammar performed the ceremony. Two years later, the statue was desecrated and dumped into the sea during the Language riots. However, before the Emergency was lifted, a replacement was flown out from Burma and installed to prevent emotional repercussions. The pieces of the broken statue were discovered by sailors and was installed in “Elara” where it remains to date.
Training & Operations at sea
Apart from the cruises mentioned above, “Vijaya” undertook several training and operational tasks, including:
- A visit to Port Blair in the Andaman Islands with VNF officers and sailors (1954).
- A visit to Male with VNF officers and sailors (1954)
- A training cruise to Bombay and Karachchi (1954)
- A visit to Madras with VNF officers and sailors (1955)
- A visit to Cochin on a Minseweeping exercise (1955)
She also took part in the annual JET Exercises (Joint Exercises, Trincomalee) along with other commonwealth navies every year.
Naval Ensign
During the greater part of this period, Ceylon had not designed nor adopted a National Flag and this had hampered the designing of a White Ensign for the Navy. Once the National flag was adopted, the R.Cy.N. had its own White Ensign which differed from the British one only in that the National Flag replaced the Union Jack on the upper left quarter. The new Ensign was hoisted for the first time on Navy Day, 1955.
The period under review ended with a change of government following a General Election in which a coalition of parties opposed to the party formerly in power won by a large majority. The effect this change was to have on the Navy, whether in the short, medium or long terms, could not have been anticipated.
CHAPTER 6
1956 – 1960 – EXPANSION AS A “BLUE WATER” NAVY
The Significance of 1956
The year 1956 – an election year – holds a special significance in the country’s history and an equally special significance in the development of the Navy. Politically, its significance is that there arose a movement, which had at its centre the empowerment of a segment of the population which, though less powerful economically, was numerically very large. In terms of social structure, this segment represented the rural and non-English speaking populace.
The political party in power was denigrated as “brown sahibs” who wanted to be hold on to power as lineal descendents of the British Raj. Whether such characterization was correct or not (or neither) is a matter of opinion. The movement, or the several movements, coalesced round the cry for “Sinhala – Buddhism” and, particularly, the cry to make Sinhala the Official Language of the country. The movement was powerful enough to make even the party in power accept the cry of “Sinhala Only”. This change of policy was seen as “too little, too late” and in the General Election on 1956, the ruling United National Party (UNP) was reduced to a minority party. Power passed into the hands of a coalition of parties under the name of the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) and the leadership of Prime Minister S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike.
Significance in relation to the Foreign Policy
The defence and foreign policy of the new government had a major impact on the Navy. The main change that took place resulted from the re-negotiation of the Agreements reached with the British, at the time Dominion Status was granted, concerning the retention of British bases on Ceylon soil. Under that Agreement, British bases of considerable size were permitted to remain and look after British regional interests. These were, mainly, the Airport at Katunayake, the Communication facility at Welisara and the Dockyard at Trincomalee although, as has been mentioned in the earlier chapter, the Naval Port of Trincomalee itself had come under the control of the Captain of the Navy.
One of the many strands of the cry against the earlier government was that these Agreements had been made a pre-condition for the grant of Dominion Status in the Commonwealth and that, therefore, the presence of the British in these bases constituted an ever-present possibility of British intervention in Ceylon politics. To the new government this was a wholly unacceptable state of affairs and the taking-over of the bases was considered essential to make the country truly free of British influence. In a geo-political scenario where the world was divided into “Western” and “Eastern” power-blocs, the new government was very committed to a stand of “co-existence” in world politics : a policy, not merely of neutrality, but of being non-aligned to power-blocs and of being equally friendly with all. The presence of the British bases was considered as compromising this stand. The Prime Minister articulated the stand of his government on this matter several times in Parliament and elsewhere:
“I have dealt with the dangers of …... the presence of bases in countries, including Ceylon.” (House of Representatives, August 2nd 1956)
“….. the present government of Ceylon has expressed its intention that the bases in Ceylon of Britain should cease to exist.” (Commonwealth Press Association, London, July 5th 1956.)
“The last remnants of colonialism in this country have been removed; the bases will no longer exist. On October 15th, this year, the base at Trincomalee will be handed over to Ceylon by the British Government. That will be one more step towards full freedom – the removal of rather stubborn remnants of Colonialism. I hope Katunayake will also be taken over.” (House of Representatives, July 24, 1957)
“Today our independence is complete …… two weeks ago, at a simple but historic ceremony, the Trincomalee naval base was handed over to Ceylon. Today we have taken that agreement a step further.” (Speech at Katunayake Airport, November 1st, 1957)
Significance in relation to the Navy
The closure of the bases meant that the Navy had to take over more duties and greater responsibility for the patrolling and defence of territorial waters. Before this, however, it had to cope with the large areas of RN property that was handed over to it. The first camp taken over was “Ella” Camp at Diyatalawa in June, 1957. Up to then, naval training was carried out within a part of the Army Training Camp there but now H.M.Cy.S.“Rangalla” moved into the fully-equipped “Ella” camp. This camp was, about the end of this period, handed over to the Army and the “Uva” camp, very near the town, was taken over by the Navy as “Rangalla”.
In Colombo, too, new buildings were erected along "Galle Buck" - what is now named “Chaitya Road”. The buildings now occupied by the Dept. of Immigration and Emigration were built here for the Navy and, later, an Auxillary Barracks, too, which is now occupied by the Police. All the buildings in this complex comprised H.M.Cy.S. “Gemunu” which functioned as a tender to Naval Headquarters. The references to “Gemeunu 1” and “Gemunu 11” ceased, although the Boom Defence Depot, the Boatyard and the Workshops continued to be administered from Naval Headquarters.
On 24.5.58, the VNF Wardroom at H.M.Cy.S “Lanka” at Kochchikade was ceremonially opened.
The take-over of the Royal Navy Base at Trincomalee
Soon after, on 15th October the same year, the British flag was hauled down for the last time in the RN base at Trincomalee. This was considered a move of great significance and carried out with maximum media cout one man’s meat is another’s poison: the RN Dockyard employees who were being laid off were demonstrating outside the Dockyard gate and the Prime Minister, who had come by air to China Bay came, most fittingly, by sea for the take-over ceremony.
Speaking on the naval historical significance of this occasion, the Acting High Commissioner for the U.K., H.E. T.L.Crossthwait, commented:
“….that the ceremony takes place during the term of the one hundredth holder of the distinguished post of Commander-in-chief, East Indies and that the flagship of the East Indies Squadron anchored in the Bay was ‘Ceylon’. It is with pride that we see this Base transferred to the Royal Ceylon Navy which can develop to make it, in its turn, a fitting contribution to the security and well-being of your country.”
The Prime Minister, emphasizing the significance to Ceylon of this occasion, said:
“The ceremony today marks another milestone in the long but not uninteresting history of Trincomalee to which briefly but happily His Excellency (the acting U.K.High Commissioner) has just made reference. The relationship between the United Kingdom and Ceylon goes back to a period of over 140 years. It is a somewhat chequered history but may I say one that, on the whole, can be considered a happy one.
“Nearly ten years ago an important step was taken in the relationship between our two countries when Ceylon demanded and was granted Dominion status, a position of equality in the Commonwealth of Nations and, as His Excellency has mentioned, the Naval Base of Trincomalee which was used during the last war continued to be used thereafter. When my Government assumed office a little over a year ago, in pursuance of our foreign policy, we requested the Government of the United Kingdom to hand over the Naval Base of Trincomalee to us. This step was not taken in a spirit of hostility.
“Our foreign policy which is based on friendship, co-operation with all nations and non-alignment with any of the power blocs of the world, necessitated such a step if such a policy was in fact to be effective………..
“You have witnessed today a simple but, I venture to think, a very impressive ceremony which will further strengthen the freedom of our country and equally strengthen those bonds of friendship between the United Kingdom and ourselves ……..”
Trincomalee had been occupied by the British since 1796, when it had been captured during the Napoleanic wars, and formally ceded to Britain at the Peace of Amiens, to secure a safe haven for the fleet in the eastern coast of India, particularly during the inter-monsoonal cyclonic periods. Its central complex therefore went back to a 150 years or more and the buildings were historic ones. The base comprised several facilities, including the Dockyard, ship repair facilities, Base Stores, Armament Depot, a Fire service, Power station, Waterworks and a puriflication plant, Training facilities, Married quarters and many others. The tender to all this was now commissioned H.M.Cy.S “Tissa” with Lt.M.M.A.Wahid in command and the Dockyard came under Capt.I.P.Murray who was appointed Naval Officer-in-Charge, (Trincomalee), or NOIC(T). The new tasks required more men and the approved complement was accordingly raised and recruitment began. The sudden increase is graphically evident in the figures given below.
Financial year Officers Sailors
1951-52 48 510
1955-56 85 771
1956-57 91 871
1956-57 124 1550
1957-58 136 1650
Arguably one of the most difficult tasks was the taking over of all the RN property in the 1000 acre area and the Navy was short of personnel. One Supply Officer and one Supply Assistant had to cope for most of the time and, although the exercise was scheduled to be completed in two years, it had finally to be done in 9 months.
The Fleet
The ships and craft the Navy possessed were totally insufficient to cope with the new responsibilities cast upon it. Along with the policy decision to take over the bases, there had to be an increase in the number and type of vessels manned by the Navy. This aspect had not been overlooked by the new Prime Minister who realized that the sea was Ceylon’s first frontier and that the Navy should have a deep-sea capability. By 1956, the Navy had one minesweeper and a flotilla of small craft for anti-smuggling duties. The government thus took steps to increase the size and capacity of the navy.
In keeping with the sea-going tasks to which the Navy had geared itself during the war, and the period of planning for a post-war Navy, the choice of ships was minesweepers and frigates. The “Vijaya” was a minesweeper and another was acquired from England. The ex-H.M.S.“Pickle”, also an “Algerine” class minesweeper whose bell is still mounted outside Naval Headquarters, was taken over at Devonport, England on 12.9.58 and commissioned H.M.Cy.S.“Parakrama” under the command of Lt.Cdr.A.M.Caldera. She was a much newer ship than the “Vijaya” and was powered by steam turbines, while “Vijaya” had reciprocating engines. She was by far the best ship the Navy had, though not the largest.
Negotiations were also undertaken to buy two “River” class Frigates fitted-out with anti-submarine detection and attack equipment from Israel. The first, ex-“Mivtach” commissioned H.M.Cy.S.“Mahasena” on 4.9.59 (Cdr.S.T.R.Proctor) was transferred to Ceylon at Djibuti in the Red Sea, while yet steaming, as there was an Arab-Israeli war on and “Mahasena” had to fly under our own colours through a war zone to prevent being attacked. The second ship, H.M.Cy.S. “Gajabahu”, ex-“Misnak”, was delivered to Colombo by an Israeli crew and commissioned on 26.4.60 (Capt.I.P.Murray). Prior to the purchase of these ships, an Ocean-going Tug, ex-H.M.S. “Adept” had been taken over from the RN and commissioned H.M.Cy.S. “Aliya” on 18.11.57 (Lt.Cdr.A.M.Caldera).
“Vijaya” continued to sail on cruises to neighbouring countries, which combined operational with training needs, while also serving as goodwill visits. In March, 1957 she sailed on a mainly operational cruise to Madras, shortly followed by another to Cochin. In May she sailed for Singapore. Port Swettenham and Penang. These crises helped make available trained and experienced crews for the new ships as they were taken over.
This was to be the pattern to be followed to make the R.Cy.N. a force to be reckoned with in our own waters. Political events, however, once again intervened, and this point marked the apogee of the expansionist policy.
Political unrest and Assassination
The MEP coalition did not succeed as a happy one. On the one hand, aggrieved forces that had lately lost power sought every opportunity to regain their influence. On another, elements within the coalition were unhappy at what was perceived as too slow a rate of change and, lastly, the Tamil political parties and their supporters sought to win back some of what were considered "lost privileges". The Prime Minister, a man of a more far-seeing nature than was viewed by many at that time, tried to build a bridge between the two major communities and the “Bandaranaike – Chelvanayagam” (or “B-C”) pact, was drawn up by him and S.J.V.Chelvanayagam, the leader of the largest Tamil party. Although there were the usual dissenting voices within the coalition, it was the ousted UNP, in a move led by J.R.Jayawardene, which gathered sufficient momentum for the Prime Minister to be forced to shelve the proposals. The communal feeling thus roused led to Island-wide communal riots in 1958 which, in turn, led to Ceylon being condemned and considered politically unstable by many countries. In the years that were yet to come, this was considered the beginning of communal tension in Ceylon.
The Navy was involved in several emergency duties during the so-called “Language Riots” of April-May, 1958, when the Navy was called out and a “State of Emergency” declared. In one particular incident the Navy was more concerned than usual. This was the attack on the Nagavihara temple on Nagadipa. A story had been put about that the Buddhists priests had been involved in the burning of a Poosari in Panadura. The Nagavihara had been attacked and sacked and the statue installed by the Navy had been thrown into the sea. The priests had been stripped and assaulted. The Navy had rescued about 20 monks and given them asylum with VIP treatment at the Navy base for about two months. Before the story leaked out, the Navy undertook the restoration of the vihara and, before the “Emergency” was lifted, Mr.Rajah Hewavitharana of the Mahabodhi Society had obtained a statue, similar to the desecrated one, from Burma, which was flown in and installed in the temple premises. These precautions were taken to prevent retaliation by unlawful elements elsewhere in the country.
Ironically, the “coup de grace” to the Bandaranaike era was delivered, not by a Tamil or opposition politician but by a Buddhist monk belonging to the extremist fringe of the ruling party, who assassinated the Prime Minister in his own house by shooting him with a revolver. While the inquiry got under way, the next most senior member of the coalition, W.Dahanayake formed a caretaker cabinet to maintain continuity.
As far as the Navy was concerned, all these events, as well as the heavy floods of 1957, led to the need to assist civil authorities to maintain law and order and render assistance to those in need. On 26.12.57, a office for the Special Commissioner for Flood Relief was established at Naval Headquarters.
The Navy’s function of maintaining the essential services of the Port of Colombo undisturbed was implemented partly by mobilizing the VNF “Tissa” Division to accommodate these persons.
Apart from providing assistance to the Police, the main naval operations continued to be anti-Illicit Immigration and anti-Smuggling patrolling.
Apart from patrolling, the R.Cy.N. continued to host the JET (Joint Exercises, Trincomalee) on a regular basis. JET 1960 became the largest of the exercises up to that year, with 38 ships from six Commonwealth countries participating.
Command, and Administrative structure
There was no change in command during this period. Capt.G.R.M.De Mel who had been appointed as Captain of the Navy in the rank of Captain in 12.7.57 and promoted to Commodore the next day, was promoted Rear Admiral on 13.7.57.
The command and administrative structure continued without major change. Apart from the Chief Staff Officer and the Secretary, the Captain of the Navy’s staff comprised Staff Officers who were the senior-most officers in each of the major branches and functional operations of the Navy:
Staff Engineering Officer - SEO
Staff, Electrical Engineering Officer, - SLO
Staff Supplies Officer - SSO
Staff Medical Officer - SMO
Staff Communications Officer - SCO
Staff Gunnery Officer - SGO
Staff Sports Officer - SSpO
Training continued and increased in numbers and pace to keep up with the expanding requirements at sea and on land. Increasing numbers were sent for specialist training in England and in India, and later Pakistan, officer cadets and sailors were attached to ships in their fleets for sea-time and experience. Although “Vijaya” and “Rangalla” did their best to give the new entrants pre-formal training, it became imperative to give an academic base to the training given, particularly after the Dartmouth Officer Cadet training was increased from two to eight terms. It was decided to start an Instructor Officer Branch and one officer was selected by Capt. Brown, namely, Instructor Lieutenant M.G.S.Perera who was already a Petty Officer in the Engine Room Branch. A “Classroom” was allocated and initial training given in Navigation, Chartwork and Pilotage for Cadets and Instructional Technique (IT) for sailors. When the pre-Dartmouth training was later increased to one year, two more Inst.Lts. were selected to bring the cadets up to G.C.E. ‘A’ level standard in academic subjects: Inst.Lt.S.Navaratnarajah (Pure & Applied Mathematics) and, later, Inst.Lt. W.H.Botejue (Physics, Chemistry and Electronics). After 1956 and the change of Official language to Sinhala it became necessary for the Navy to effect a programme of change-over and Inst.Lt.M.L.Mendis was commissioned for this task. In 1960, the branch expanded with the commissioning of Inst.Lts.H.D.L.M. Palmon, S.Devendra and E.M.A.Perera, and plans were made to set up a pre-Dartmouth training establishment in the newly taken over “Uva” Camp at Diyatalawa.
At this time, professionally-qualified personnel were directly commissioned in the rank of Lieutenant in selected branches, namely, Surgeon Lieutenants in the Medical branch, Instructor Lieutenants in the Instructor branch and a certain number of selected personnel in the Supply Branch. All of them had to be graduates.
CHAPTER 7
1960 – 1965: THE NAVY BECALMED
Every individual, movement or institution experiences its highs and lows in the course of its progress, and the Navy is no exception. The task of the historian, chronicler or recorder, is not to be judge and/or jury; nor to affix blame or find justification. His task is only to record tacts and set them down. In this chronicle, therefore, this most sensitive period of the Navy’s history will be treated in this manner, in fairness to Truth and with favour to none.
In the latter 1950s, the Navy experienced the start of a promise of growth into a Navy of respectable size and capability. Like all the best-laid plans of mice and men, this went astray. A series of events that occurred during this period made the yet-burgeoning promise a thing of the past, and the Navy experienced a change of fortunes. While the outcome of all this proved very galling to naval personnel, it is necessary to record that the negative results experienced were as much due to the actions of some members of the Navy as to those of the government in power.
Before the ill-effects on the Navy due to various causes are recorded, it is necessary to describe certain events that, singly and in combination, led to their occurrence.
The Far Eastern Cruise
The period began with no hint of what was to follow. The second of the frigates purchased from Israel, the “Gajabahu” had been taken delivery of. A new intake of officer cadets and sailors were under training at the new training base in Diyatalawa. On the political front, another General Election had been held which, while voting the caretaker Prime Minister out of office, voted into office a “hung” Parliament which lost its first test of confidence in the House. This, in turn, led to another General Election where Mrs.Sirimavo R.D.Bandaranaike, the widow of the assassinated former Prime Minister was elected by a large majority and won the further backing of several other smaller parties which she united under a coalition umbrella. While many Colombo-based people were taken by surprise at the result, the Navy had provided security to her residence during the election period, as a routine tour of duty, and she chose to have the Navy providing security for her even afterwards.
The idea was mooted that the Navy undertakes a “Show the Flag” exercise through a cruise to the Far East. In the largely unsettled period that had preceded this, foreign cruises had not been undertaken and, with new ships now available, a long cruise was considered a highly desirable exercise. The ships selected were the frigate “Mahasena” and the minesweeper “Parakrama”. Rear Adm.de Mel would also take passage, and fly his flag on the “Mahasena”, maintaining administrative and operational control over the Navy back home through a “rear link” procedure. This was considered an excellent idea and the cruise got underway.
The “Mahasena” under the command of Cdr.R.Proctor and the “Parakrama” under the command of Lt.Cdr.D.I.de Livera sailed on a good-will visit, touching at Singapore, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Port Swettenham and Penang. Rear Adm. De Mel and his personal staff flew direct to Japan, to take passage back on the “Mahasena”. However, “Parakrama” experienced technical problems at Hong Kong which involved delay. Adverse weather conditions were also reported in the China Sea which would have made it hazardous for a ship of the size of “Parakrama” to sail. It was therefore decided that she remain in Hong Kong and that the “Mahasena” should sail alone to Japan. This leg of the cruise was completed successfully, in spite of heavy seas and high winds. In Tokyo, the R.Cy.N. was welcomed and treated with great hospitality. The Ambassador at this time was an old Naval Officer himself, Sir Susantha de Fonseka, and the Navy made good ambassadors for the country in Japan.
After the visit, Rear Adm. De Mel took passage on the “Mahasena”, flying his flag. At Hong Kong, when they re-joined the “Parakrama”, it was found that all was not well. The ship had been commissioned by the Ministry of Defence to bring back a cargo of ammunition but, apart from this, certain self-serving officers had conspired to take on board a large cargo of liquour and spirits. The problem was compounded when an anonymous source had informed the government in Colombo that the ships were bringing back arms and ammunition to be given to the agents of “Catholic Action”. Since the mid-fifties it was a widely-held belief that Roman Catholic extremists were unhappy with the government in power and that they were seeking means of overthrowing it. The report was thus treated seriously.
Upon arrival in Colombo, the ships ran into a blizzard of accusations and recriminations. The Inspector General of Police (IGP) boarded “Mahasena” upon arrival to check whether she was carrying arms and ammunition over and above her requirements. The Commanding Officer said that he was, in fact, bringing a consignment of ammunition but that it was for the government. After an inspection of the documents, it was found that there was no basis for the charge. For reasons that were later inquired into by a Commission of Inquiry, the IGP was not taken to view the arms and ammunition in the ships’ magazines. It was here that the illegal consignment of liquor was stored.
While the IGP reported to the Ministry that there was no basis for believing that arms and ammunition had been smuggled on board, Naval. Headquarters initiated a Signal instructing the ship to sail to Kalpitiya on a routine patrol. It has, since, been suggested that this opportunity should have been made use of to dump the offending articles overboard. Whether this would have been a successful ploy is open to question: but the fact is indisputable that the action of taking this cargo of contraband on board was wrong. What did happen on the patrol was that certain personnel who had contacts with questionable persons on land in that area, unloaded the cargo for sale. It did not take long for the intelligence to reach Colombo and the Navy now found itself in very deep water. A large number of officers and sailors were interdicted pending a Commission of Inquiry and the Captain of the Navy, who had flown his flag on the “Mahasena”, was relieved of his duties. After the Commissioner had completed his inquiry and submitted his report (K.D.de Silva: “Navy Commission Report”, Sessional Paper VI of April 1963) nine officers had their commissions withdrawn, eight were compulsorily retired and a number of sailors discharged.
The Attempted “Coup de etat”
While the Commission of Inquiry was yet underway, information was received by the government from purely unofficial sources that an attempt at overthrowing the government by a “Coup” was about to be launched. The suspects were high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces and Police, with a few members of the Ceylon Civil Service (CCS). The information, given by a Police Officer and would-be participant who had undergone a belated “change of heart”, was largely accurate and could be corroborated. The government acted without hesitation or delay and, by calling upon the loyal officers of the Forces and Police – who were in the great majority – arrested the leaders of the “Coup” and effectively put an end to it. Once again, many officers were arrested: this time largely from the Army and Police. Yet, one name that did transpire was that of the Captain of the Navy, who was under interdiction for his role in the Far Eastern Cruise. He, however, was able to evade arrest, surrendering to Court only when the case was called up.
The arrested persons were tried in a special court under an Act of Parliament specially passed, and most were found guilty. An appeal, however, was made to the Privy Council which was, at that time, the supreme judicial body for Dominions in the Commonwealth. When the Appeal was heard, the Privy Council upheld the preliminary objection that was raised by the Appellants, namely, that the appointment of the Special Court was bad in law and, without reviewing the evidence, the Appellants were discharged. This was to have political repercussions in the years to come.
Repercussions
The two incidents described above made the government very suspicious of the Armed Forces. It was also freely speculated that the conspirators had, at least, the tacit support of the Roman Catholic Church, the major opposition party and even the Head of State, the Governor General. While none of this was inquired into and the findings made public, a series of steps were taken affecting them, notably the replacement of the Governor-General. While none of this was inquired into and the findings made public, a series of steps were taken affecting them, notably the replacement of the Governor-General.
Among the Armed Forces the Navy earned the government’s greatest displeasure. It can be reasonably concluded that the Captain of the Navy’s personal involvement with the two incidents described above was the prime ingredient for this. A series of steps were taken that, singly and cumulatively, eroded the position of the Navy in the country and a lowering of morale among its members. Among the many steps taken were the following:
* The recruitment into the Navy of any sailors or officers or officer cadets was stopped indefinitely. All vacancies in approved cadre were not to be filled.
* Officer cadets undergoing pre-Dartmouth training were not permitted to proceed to England but sent to India instead. Even some Midshipmen under training in the U.K. who had come to Ceylon between terms, were not permitted to return to complete their studies but sent to Pakistan and India instead.
* The Navy’s oldest base outside Colombo, H.M.Cy.S.“Rangalla” in Diyatalawa, was taken away from the Navy and handed over to the Army; the Navy being permitted to retain only the small holiday bungalows.
* The Navy Sports grounds at Galle Face was taken away from the Navy and handed over to the Army.
* All the Navy buildings along the present “Chaitya Road”, including H.M.Cy.S. “Gemunu”, the Auxiliary Barracks and event the smaller buildings were also handed over to the Dept. of Immigration and Emigration and the Police.
* A decision was taken to dispose of the Navy’s bigger ships and not replace them. The “Mahasena” and “Parakrama”, which had been on the Far Eastern Cruise, were de-commissioned and sold to a Singapore ship-breakers’ yard on 23.9.66. By an ironic twist of Fate, the “Mahasena” ’s last Commanding Officer, Lt.Dcr.M.M.A.Wahid, was in Singapore on duty when the tug “Ajax” towed the two ships in. These were the two better ships the Navy had and the objectivity and wisdom of the decision that they be sold, rather than the “Gajabahu” and the “Vijaya” which were retained, is open to question. The Fleet Tug, H.M.Cy.S.“Aliya” was also de-commissioned.
* When Cyclone “Emily” hit Trincomalee on Christmas Eve, 1964, the Seaward Defence Boat H.M.Cy.S.“Kotiya”, which was secured to the two-fathom jetty with her engines removed for repairs, sank at her moorings; and the already de-commissioned “Vijaya” broke her moorings and ran aground. A decision was taken not to replace them.
* With Rear Adm.G.R.M. de Mel being relieved of command his successor, Capt. R.Kadirgammar was made “Temporary Commodore, Acting Captain of the Navy” under which rank and appointment he had to function for four years.
Although all these measures were not taken at once, but at intervals, the cumulative effect they had upon the Navy as whole was demoralizing in the short-term and harmful in the long-term. The Navy was deprived of five of its six craft with ocean-going capability, and two of its most valuable bases. There was an exodus, of sorts, of officers and men who felt that those who remained in the Navy, in spite of being innocent of any wrongdoing, were being punished because the Service itself was being targeted for discriminatory treatment. Some of those who left were the better and most experienced the Navy had, though some were those who could not stand up to the ill-winds of misfortune. The least desirable, also, remained. Yet, following the leadership of those who had Navy blood in their veins, the majority of the Navy stood firm, with heads unbowed.
In retrospect it is apparent that the punishment (th the Navy) did not fit the crime. While the guilty were punished, it was not necessary to demoralize the Navy as a whole. Yet this was what happened. It was obvious to the discerning, even then, that the massive loss of accumulated experience and the policy of evaporation that was followed, would have a very grave effect on the Navy of a future era, and in a manner that could not be envisaged. This, unfortunately came true: when, upon the assassination of Adm.W.W.E.C.Fernando, he had to be succeeded by an officer who joined the Navy 15 tears after him, the spectre of the long years of non-recruitment returned to haunt the Navy. The effect on the sailors was worse. An annual intake meant continuity: an intake after seven years constituted a generation gap. This, the Navy had to live with. The ill-effects of the sale and de-commissioning of the ships became evident less than ten year after. With the outbreak of the Insurgency of 1971, when gun-running and foreign support to the insurgents were suspected to come by sea, the Navy had no sea-going capacity at all to counteract the danger. Ceylon had to appeal to friendly countries for their Navies to patrol our waters. It took long years of another conflict for the Navy to regain its lost prestige among the navies of the world. The lessons learnt must not be forgotten.
Command and Administration
Rear Adm.G.R.M.de Mel was relieved of command and Capt. R.Kadirgammar promoted Temporary Commodore and appointed Acting Captain of the Navy on 16.11.60. He was confirmed in both rank and post on 1.7.64. Rear Adm.de Mel retired from the Navy on 15.8.61.
Headquarters administrative structure underwent a change with a system of Directorates being introduced: Director, Naval Staff Duties (DSD), Director, Naval Administration and Personnel (DAPS), Director, Naval Logistics Division (DLD), Director, Naval Engineering (DNE) [Details now forgotten]
The Fleet
The second frigate purchased from Israel was delivered at Colombo and commissioned H.M.Cy.S.“Gajabahu” (Capt.I.P.Murray) on 26.4.60.
H.M.Cy.S.“Mahasena” was de-commissioned on 31.5.62.
H.M.Cy.S.“Parakrama” was de-commissioned on 13.12.63.
H.M.Cy.S.“Aliya” was de-commissioned on 31.3.63.
H.M.Cy.S.“Vijaya” was de-commissioned on 31.3.63.
H.M.Cy.S.“Kotiya” sank at her moorings during the cyclone on 24.12.64.
Towards the end of the period, the need for some additional craft was recognized and orders were placed for two 45’ Thorneycroft Patrol Craft from Singapore and these were received on 26.9.65.
The Fleet, therefore, comprised the “Gajabahu” and some of the Patrol Craft purchased in the 1950-56 era. Once again a “One-ship Navy” in numbers and effectiveness, it ranked even below its capacity in 1956.
Shore Establishments and Duties
In spite of the decisions taken that had a negative effect on morale and operational capability, the Navy was called upon to shoulder new tasks and carry on with traditional ones.
In 1962, the Navy was called upon to take over the last British base in Ceylon, a wireless station at Welisara, which had become H.M.S.“Highflyer” after the hand-over of Trincomalee. With the Colombo properties being lost, this now became H.M.Cy.S.“Gemunu”.
In 1964, the Navy opened a TAFII (Task Force, Anti Illicit Immigration) base at Chempankundu, which was later commissioned as H.M.Cy.S.“Vijaya II”. Its function was to watch the coast line north of Mannar as part of the Task Force which was largely Army controlled. No sea-going duties were undertaken and five Coast Watching Points (CWPs) and two Searchlight Points (SLPs) were manned.
In 1965, the naval area at Kochchikade (other than the VNF Headquarters), including the Boatyard, Workshops, the newly established “Naval Educational Services Centre”, Harbour Examination Service, Experimental Underwater Unit, Scientific Equipment Unit and Base Stores, Colombo, was commissioned H.M.Cy.S.“Rangalla” under the command of Inst.Lt.Cdr.M.G.S.Perera. This base had to service naval craft calling at the Kochchikade pier and to undertake Colombo Harbour Anti-smuggling Operations which involved searching all sailing craft entering and leaving harbour for contraband and illicit immigrants. The earlier base by this name, at Diyatalawa, had been converted to a Technical Training Centre when recruitment was frozen. It had undertaken the training of Stoker Mechanics and Artificer Apprentices, thus gaining valuable experience in a form of training more complex than recruit training in Ceylon, using Ceylones expertise. It had become the first base to have all officers, including the Commanding Officer (Inst.Lt.Cdr. M.G.S.Perera) from the Instructor Branch. It was de-commissioned on 31.12.63.
The Navy really proved its mettle during and immediately after the Cyclone hit Trincomalee and ploughed a path across the island from east to west. Apart from putting to rights the massive damage it had done to the Dockyard and other naval installations, the Navy was able to give valuable assistance to other organizations and institutions. These included:
Emergency electrical power to the government Base Hospital; Security patrolling of Trincomalee at the request of the Government Agent; Setting up emergency communications with Mannar and the islands; Providing pilotage to Merchant vessels going the northern waters about which their officers had no knowledge of; Transport of food, medical supplies and fuel to Mannar on “Gajabahu”; Salvage of Ilmenite Corporation tugs that had run aground in Trincomalee; Transport of government officials to inaccessible areas; and, most importantly, the salvage of the s.s.“Goshen”, the Indo-Ceylon ferry, which had been carried 200 yards inland by the heavy wind and seas.
Other duties, of a routine nature, performed by the Navy during this period included:
Providing security to the Sugar factory during a strike;
Flood-relief duties;
Security for Laxapana, Grandpass and Stanley Power Stations;
Anti-fish dynamiting patrols in Trincomalee;
Assistance to the Police during the Elections;
Taking the trawler “Gandara” to sea for the Fisheries Corporation when the crew went on strike;
Maintaining communications with the islands off Jaffna in the aftermath of the cyclone and
Providing security to Queen’s House during Election time
In spite of the best efforts of the senior staff, morale did not, however, improve. Even the Captain of the Navy was moved to officially place on record – however circumspectly – the prevailing mood. In his Administration Report for the year 1963-64, his opening paragraph on “Policy” contained only one sentence:
“The Defence Policy, in so far as the Navy is concerned, has yet to be implemented by the Ministry of Defence.”
In later paragraphs he commented:
“Vacancies in Service and Civilian Cadre continue to be frozen ……. The Service and Civilian Strength is far below the sanctioned cadre. The Navy is grossly undermanned.”
At this time, the disparity between the Approved and Actual cadre was as follows:
Approved Actual
REGULARS
Officers 154 118
Sailors 1820 1563
Civilians 1309 1036
Seconded 6 1
VOLUNTEERS
Officers 35 14
Sailors 350 171
In the end, it was not a military “Coup” that led to a change of government near the end of its Parliamentary life, but a plan set in motion by the Opposition to defeat the government in Parliament. The occasion was an important Bill which was put to the vote at a time the government was not in a position to muster sufficient votes to ensure a win. The Prime Minister, following time-honoured custom faithfully, resigned.
CHAPTER 8
1965-70: SMALL SHIPS AND BIG IDEAS
General Elections, particularly when they result in a change in the political party in power, can create the impression that a major change of policy will take place. Change does often take place, though not necessarily to the extent in terms of expectations. The change that took place in the 1965 Election was that the party which had lost power in 1956, now came back as the largest single party and formed the new government with the backing of some other parties.
As far as the Navy was concerned, a change of policy did take place, but not to the extent that the Navy itself wished for. This section, therefore, deals with the changes that took place and the form of the Navy that emerged.
Policy
The Captain of the Navy’s observation on Defence policy and the Ministry of Defence has already been quoted. The change that took place with the new government, and the Captain of the Navy’s hopes and expectations are best illustrated in his comments under the same heading in his Administration Report for the very next year:
"With the assumption of office of a new government after the general election, the role of the Navy in Anti Illicit Immigration problems was established as a primary one. This decision was immediately implemented by making financial provision for an increased fleet of Fast Patrol Boats. In the Internal Security Plan the Navy was entrusted with the maintenance of the Port, the generation and distribution of power, the operation of Radio Ceylon and the water system of Colombo. All restrictions previously imposed on recruitment were removed.”
The way was cleared for recruitment of officers and sailors, for the purchase of craft (although of a limited size) and the Navy’s specific functions were spelled out. However, the hope that the Fleet would be allowed to purchase bigger ships did not materialize.
Command and Administration
There was no change in Command during almost the entirety of this period. Capt.R.Kadigammar who had been given the rank of Temporary Commodore in 1960 and confirmed in rank as Commodore, continued in command. On 1.10.67 he was promoted Rear Admiral, and on 1.6.70, handed over command to Commodore D.V.Hunter.
While the internal administration was continued under the system of Directorates, a Naval Board of Control was set in place with all Directors and Staff Officers serving on it. A major change was introduced by the bifurcation of internal functions under two Chief Staff Officers who were directly under the Captain of the Navy. These were the Chief Staff Officer (Operations), or CSO(O) and the Chief Staff Officer (Support & Systems), or CSO(S&S). Other Directors and Principal & Staff Officers were appointed named “Principal Advisors”: namely, Principal Medical Officer (PMO), Judge Advocate (JA), Director, Finance and Civil Administration (DFCA), Commandant, Naval and Maritime Academy (CN & MA), Staff Engineer Officer (SEO) and Staff Electrical Officer (SLO).
The Fleet
The only ship the Navy had during this period was the “Gajabahu”. The older LPBs and SPBs that had been purchased in the 1950-56 period had been down-graded and de-commissioned, although some were yet in use.
In 1965, under a change of policy adopted by the previous government towards the end of its stewardship, two wooden hulled, unarmed 45’ patrol craft built by Thorneycroft at Singapore had been purchased for trial, prior to more being purchased. These were not commissioned but given pennant numbers, PC 106 and 107. They were found to be suitable for the Anti-Illicit Immigration (Anti-II) role now delegated to the Navy as its primary one, and it was decided that more be purchased after they had been modified according to naval requirements. Two Patrol Boat squadrons were to be formed. On 18.6.66. three more were taken delivery of and assigned penant numbers PC 101, 103 and 104 and, on 1.8.67, PC 102, 105, 108 and 109 were taken delivery of. PC 110 was taken over on 12.2.68. This was the First PC squadron.
In 1968, the Second PC Squadron was formed: PC 201 on 27.1.68, PC 202, 203 and 204 on 12.2.68 and PC 207, 210 and 211.
Apart from the first two PCs, which were delivered in fully-built condition, the others were imported in a “knocked-down” condition and assembled locally. In all, 24 PCs were brought into operation. In addition to the Thorneycrofts, 2 x 32’ Halmatic and 2 x 28’ Tornado PCs were also purchased.
“Gajabahu” continued to play her role which, after recruitment of officer cadets and sailors became a reality, soon expanded to include sea-training. A new pier was built at Kochchikade for the use of the Navy to cater to the flotilla of Patrol Craft.
There had been no exercises involving working with a fleet since the operational larger ships had been disposed of and the annual JET Exercises had ceased. It was thus decided to start a similar programme involving the Patrol Craft, to keep the sea-going skills of officers and sailors exercised. An exercise named CEYNAVEX was therefore commenced with “Gajabahu” taking the leading role and the crews of the PC, carrying out exercises and operations suited to the type of craft. CEYNAVEX was conducted in 1967, 1968 and 1969.
Functions and Operations
This period saw the Navy defining and fashioning its own role in more far-seeing and imaginative ways. It saw itself as “the reservoir or national maritime skills” and not only advocated but also demonstrated its ability to fill this role to the government. In his Navy Day Message in December, 1968, the Captain of the Navy said:
“Today we are again proving and demonstrating our great usefulness to our people and to the State. We have established and proved that we are dependable and outstandingly competent.”
“We shall continue to be the major maritime limb of the Nation. The Academy will be recognized as the only institution for the acquisition of naval and maritime knowledge. The National Shipping Corporation will be established shortly and will draw its strength from the Navy…….
“Our duty is to serve and that is what we shall do as we have always done.”
The Navy, therefore, undertook several new tasks during this period.
In the wake of the cyclone, a US Navy diving team had arrived to assist with salvage operations. A core group of officers and sailors with swimming skills were trained by them and later an Experimental Diving Unit had been formed under Lt.T. Somasunderam. The experiment proving successful, the team had been sent abroad for training. Lt.Somasunderam and Surg.Lt.M.Amarasingha to the US and several sailors to India. They proved useful to the Navy, particularly for retrieving contraband jettisoned overboard by smugglers and their services were soon sought after by civilian authorities for a variety of tasks ranging from retrieving bodies drowned in rivers to clearing sluice-gates of irrigation tanks under near-zero visibility.
It was anticipated that a need for Hydrographic Services would arise in the future and that as in the U.K., India and Pakistan, the Hydrographer for the Navy would be the authority. The Navy therefore began to send officers abroad for graduate and post-graduate courses in Hydrography and Oceanography and sailors on Survey Recorders courses, purchase the basic equipment and set up a Hydrographic Unit. After the Unit was organized a de-commissioned SPB was attached to it as a survey vessel.
The Navy also deemed it necessary to contribute to the government’s efforts to work towards self-sufficiency in food, and established the Naval Agricultural and Livestock Project (NALP) at the Headworks area in the naval water supply system in Trincomalee. The Project was manned by VNF officers and sailors and initially cultivated rice and ran a livestock project. Later, the lake itself was stocked with fish and became a thriving dried-fish industry.
The Navy volunteered to assist, by training, personnel of other government institutions which required persons with sea-going skills. H.M.Cy.S.Rangalla ran a pilot project of training Fisheries Dept. deck-hands. This programme was later carried to further lengths with the establishment of the Naval & Maritime Academy in Trincomalee. Here training was continued for Fisheries personnel in both deck and engine-room duties, for that Department’s Instructors and Apprentice Mates, for drivers of Police launches and finally, a certificate course for Shipping Corporation trainees was conducted which certificate was accepted by all shipping companies the world over.
Acting as reservoir of skilled and disciplined personnel, sailors were attached to a variety of institutions other than those mentioned earlier. Among them were the Dept. of Immigration & Emigration, Dept. for the Registration of Persons.
Many other roles were thought of, not only by the Captain of the Navy, but by many far-thinking officers. Some of them were: Merchant Shipping, Pilotage, Docking & Slipping, Salvage diving. Ships Surveying, making coastal anchorages, undertaking maintenance of Lighthouses, etc. While some of these ideas bore fruit in the years to come, others did not. The Forward Planning that was taking place within the Navy is demonstrated by the nature of non-traditional courses of training on which naval personnel were sent in 1967-68 alone:
Post-Graduate course in Oceanography (USA)
Post-Graduate course in Management(USA)
Graduate course in Basic Hydrography and Oceanography(USA)
Supply Management courses(USA)
Transportation Management courses(USA)
Modified Hydrography Course (India)
The government nationalized the port of Trincomalee on 26.10.67 and the Navy was intimately connected with Port administration thereafter. The Capt. of the Navy was appointed Working Director of the Port (Cargo) Commission, Trincomalee, and many of the facilities of the Navy were made available to that institution.
Routine Operations
Routine operations continued to be carried out, such as security for the government explosives’ magazine at Welisara, Radio Ceylon and its transmitting stations at Ekala, Dept. of Immigration and Emigration, Queen’s House, Port of Colombo; examination service at the port, assistance to Police, repatriation of Indian nationals, surveillance at the annual Kachchativu festival (Operation “Sneaker”, an anti-II exercise) etc.
A particular duty that the Navy had to participate in regard to the suspects in the “Coup” case which was proceeding. 28 suspects remanded were transferred to the Magazine Prison, Welikade and Hulftsdorp Detention Barracks under armed Navy escort. Thereafter, similar escorts were provided daily from here to the Chief Magistrate’s Court set up in Flagstaff Street, till hearings were concluded.
With regard to Emergency duties that the Navy had to undertake from time to time, a series of code-named operations were formulated which could be put into effect on a single Signal promulgated by Headquarters. They were:
Operation PRONTO
Operation HOMELAND
Operation SHOCK
Operation SUPERCHARGE
Operation CORNUCOPIA
Operation SNATCH
Operation MARCONI
Operation PLUTO
Operation CLOUDBURST
Operation LIGHTNING
The operational organization for this was the division of Naval resources in areas under Commanders of Task Forces (CTFs) who delegated their tasks to one or more Commanders of Task Groups (CTGs).
H.M.Cy.S.“Gemunu” at Welisara was made the main Communication channel between the Central Telegraph Office (CTO) and merchant ships. It also had to monitor foreign news bulletines and weather forecasts. In 1970 it was linked with the Commonwealth Communication Organization.
Recruitment and Training
With all restrictions on recruitment being lifted, the Navy sought to infuse fresh blood, through the influx of officer and sailor intakes.
The first experiment in commissioning a small number of graduates as Direct Entry Sub Lieutenants in the Executive Supply branches proved a dismal failure. The Navy had been so long out of touch with the changes in the country that it found it difficult to understand the nature of the human material they were dealing with. The same methods of training that had been used prior to 1960 were used and found wanting. The entire first intake thus left the Navy, disappointed in what they found. The later intakes, however, from the University but not graduates, proved more successful.
With the restrictions imposed for long being lifted, a fair number of senior sailors were able to be commissioned as Service entry officers and that created a domino effect, with more junior sailors having the vacancies available for promotion.
Recruitment of sailors was next taken in hand. A Recruiting team was appointed and they interviewed 3835 applicants at 11 centres island-wide. The first intakes were of miscellaneous branches (Cooks, Stewards and Musicians), 116 of whom were enlisted between June and September, 1965. A much larger intake the next year made it necessary to make special arrangements for training. H.M.Cy.S.“Tissa” had to vacate the premises it had occupied for nearly ten years and find accommodation elsewhere in the Dockyard, and the premises vacated by it was commissioned H.M.Cy.S.“Parakrama II” under the command of Lt.Cdr.A.H.A.de Silva on 1.9.66. She served exclusively as a Recruit Training establishment for this particular intake of Recruits and was de-commissioned on 1.6.67. on completion of her task. “Tissa” moved back to her original moorings.
“Parakrama II’s” training functions were immediately assumed, and expanded, by a new institution, the Naval & Maritime Academy (NMA), under a Commandant (Inst.Cdr.M.G.S.Perera) on 1.6.67. The NMA was not a commissioned base but was responsible for all naval training: Induction courses for Direct Entry Officers, Officer Cadets and Service Entry Officers; Specialist courses for sailors, and Recruit Training for sailors. The restrictions previously placed on qualified junior sailors from applying for the posts of Officer Cadets was lifted. The first Officer Cadet intake since 1960 was undertaken by the NMA in 1969 and two future Navy Commanders emerged from the first group of junior sailors selected as an Officer Cadets.
The Academy was a far cry from the Recruit Training bases of past years. It was a gradual development from the Technical Training Centre at Diyatalawa, the Educational Services Centre at Kochchikade and the large-scale training programmes of “Parakrama II”. It was headed by a Commandant, with a Training Commander under him, and its functions were divided between several Schools and Departments: the Schools were those of Nautical Science, Mechanical & Marine Engineering, Electric & Electronic Engineering, Communications and Supply, Secretariat & Catering, and Diving: and the Departments were those of Science & Mathematics, Language & Humanitites, and Physical Training. Among the specialized training facilities available were: the de-commissioned ex-H.M.Cy.S.“Vijaya” as a static training ship, Electrics/Electronic laboratories and workships, Physics & Chemistry laboratories, a Chart work Practicals Room equipped with navigational equipment, a Machine ship, Fitting & Smithy shops, a Foundry, a Carpentry shop, I.C. model and display room, a Projector room and a Library. With the experience now gained of the academically more advanced recruit and officer material available in the country, an ambitious scheme was drawn up of teaching recruits multiple skills. An intake of “Seaman Mechanics” was undertaken: these were to be taught the trades of both Seamen and Stoker Mechanics, so that they could be more useful on board the Patrol Craft with their small crews. After a period, they could choose to specialize in one of the skills. Although a very useful intake of sailors was trained, however, the experiment was put on hold as the length of the basic course was too long. In a similar attempt to bring the new Navy into line with equipment actually in use on the PCs, the time-honoured distinction between “Signalmen” and “Telegraphists” was done away with, and both amalgamated into the single branch of “Communicators” who were all trained to operate the new electronic and radio equipment installed on the craft.
By the middle of this period, the recruitment programme had succeeded to a great extent, as the following figures show:
Approved Actual
REGULARS
Officers 161 134
Sailors 1820 1817
VOLUNTEERS
Officers 21 20
Sailors 186 186
During this period, therefore, a start had been made towards the rehabilitation of the Navy. The government realized that, in the Navy, it had an invaluable national resource, which could be used effectively in more ways than one. While the actual sea-going capability of the Navy was not significantly up-graded, it was seen that its expertise was useful for other government institutions which had the need for its skills.
The Navy also took the initiative to direct the government’s attention towards its full potential in a variety of areas and one of the distinguishing features of this period is that, instead of waiting for the government to make use of it, the Navy took upon itself the task of suggesting new roles for itself in the short and long-term. The entry of new blood, new ideas and more educated personnel, both as officers and sailors, changed the character of the Navy. The “difficult days” which preceded this period can, therefore, even be considered to have been, though unpleasant, a necessary spur to radical change in the Navy – not merely, initially, for the worse but, definitely, for the better in the long run. This ‘spur’, in combination with the change of course made in the 1965-70 period, helped the Navy to emerge as a more flexible and professional one; one which was able to face the challenge of the next era with great confidence even with its limited means, and prove itself.
CHAPTER 9
1971 – : A NAVY TO SAVE DEMOCRACY
In the year 1971, the Navy “came of age” in the traditional sense of attaining the age of 21 years. It also came of age operationally when it was called upon to counter an attempt to overthrow, by force, the government that had been freely and democratically elected.
In the preceding year, a new government had been elected into office. Led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) which, in spite of winning by an overwhelming majority, invited its allies, the Lanka Samasamaja Party (SLFP) which, in spite of winning by an overshelming majority, invited its allies, the Lanka Samasamaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP) to join hands with it, a “United Front” (UF) government was sworn into office with Mrs.Sirimavo R.D.Bandaranaike as Prime Minister. One of the new government’s aims was to declare the country an independent Republic and, to give effect to this policy, a Constituent Assembly was formed which had met for the first time on 19th July, 1970. However, other political groups functioning outside the electoral system, notably the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), who had not put their policies to the test before the electorate, launched an attempt to overthrow the democratically-elected government by force of arms and the Nation had to face a “baptism by fire” in 1971. Early, decisive and resolute action by the government led to the defeat and containment of the terrorist group within a relatively short period. The government was faced with a need to look again at the role and capability of the Armed Services and it boldly chose not to look to the past but to the future in re-structuring them. This Chapter, therefore, deals with the threat, how it was countered and how the re-structuring of the Navy was taken in hand.
Command and Administration
In the preceding year, 1970, a new Captain of the Navy had been appointed, Commodore D.V.Hunter. Commodore (later Rear Admiral) Hunter had enlisted in the C.N.V.F. as a “Signalman-Gunner” with the first intake of sailors, in 1938. He thus became one of the few sailor to rise to Command a Navy, anywhere in the world. He was also to be the last of the war-time (“Okapi Navy”) personnel to command the Navy and it was fitting that he had the opportunity of leading the Navy in offensive operations in 1971. Unfortunately, he was also the first Captain of the Navy to “cross the Bar” less than a year after retirement, in Australia. A plaque in his memory was later unveiled at St.Peter’s Garrison Church, Fort, at a service where Mrs. Barbara Hunter, Rear Adm. De Mel and Rear Adm. Kadirgammar were present.
Rear Adm.Hunter handed over command on 1.3.73 to Commodore (later Rear Admiral) D.B.Goonesekera. Cmdr.Goonesekera represented the next naval generation as he had been one of the first Direct Entry Sub Lieutenants to be commissioned after the war and specifically to serve in the Navy of an independent Ceylon.
Rear Adm.Goonesekera handed over command on 31.3.79 to Cmdr. A.W.H.Perera when he was accorded a Guard of Honour and 13-gun salute. Cmdr.Perera assumed duties the next day.
Rear Adm.A.W.H.Perera, in turn, handed over command on 1.6.83 to Rear Adm.(later Vice Adm.) A.H.A.de Silva. Rear Adm. De Silva represented yet another generation of the Navy, being one of the first intake of officer cadets to be taken into the Navy and sent to Dartmouth for training.
Administratively, too, the Navy changed course and moved away from the bifurcation of functions between two Chief Staff Officers – CSO (O) and CSO (S&S). Following the structure adopted by the Army and Air Force, the Navy also opted for a Chief of Staff next to the Captain of the Navy, with Directors in charge all specialized branches and operations.
Republican Status
After the Constituent Assembly completed its task, the country assumed the Status of a Republic: the “DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA”. This change of status and nomenclature, and subsequent thinking, brought about many changes in the Navy.
The Navy itself became the SRI LANKA NAVY (SLN). Ships and establishments changed from “Her Majesty’s Ceylon Ships” to SRI LANKA NAVY SHIPS (SLNS). All insignia showing the crown as part of its design were changed by substituting the lion for the crown. The Navy Crest, alone, showed the “Darmachakra” instead of the Lion, to conform to the design elements of the National emblem.
Several subsequent changes were introduced within the Navy in keeping with the changing mood of the country. Among them was a radical change in uniform with the traditional “white tropical” uniform of sailors (short trousers, vests, blue stockings and duck caps) being replaced by slacks, short-sleeved shirts and peak caps, as adopted in India, Pakistand and the USA. The new rate of “Master Chief Petty Officers”, whose uniform included a modified shoulder strap, was introduced to give senior sailors a chance of advancement beyond Chief Petty Officer. These changes were designed to improve morale.
The term “Captain of the Navy”, which was introduced in the Navy Act, was changed to “Commander of the Navy” (COMNAV) to bring the post terminologically in line with the other two Services.
An important change was the re-designing of the naval White Ensign and Flags of Rank. The Cross of St.George was removed as it had no traditional significance to the country. Other Commonwealth (save India) had already dispensed with it. The same change, when applied to flags and pennants of rank, required complete re-designing. The red “balls” and St.George’s Cross were eliminated and a device, in red, of a Lion superimposed on an Admiralty type anchor on a white field, with red stars placed below to indicate rank (Commodore, Rear Admiral, Vice Admiral & Admiral) was introduced and the old Commodore's "Broad Pennant" laid to rest. The new White Ensign and Admiral’s standard were first broken on “Navy Day” 1976.
The Insurgency of 1971
The JVP, prime movers in the Insurgency, were a group not unknown to the Intelligence services. It advocated the overthrow of all existing political systems by force. It took the position that all established parties were committed to the continuation of the political “status quo” and to the retention of power in the hands of a ruling class, represented in all parliamentary political parties. The JVP was believed to have canvassed for the SLFP and its allies during the General Election, considering them as the lesser evil, but were quick to conclude that their own aims – that of Revolution – would have to be carried out by itself. The JVP stepped up its campaign of recruiting young people of school-going and University age, spreading the gospel that the future belonged to them and that they should take the initiative and make any sacrifice necessary to take over power themselves. Although its philosophy and activities were known to Intelligence agencies, the extent of its influence and action plan were not as well known. The leader, Rohana Wijeweera, was arrested on suspicion and while he was yet in custody, the first attack on a Police Station at Moneragala, took place on 5.4.97. Almost immediately afterwards, similar attacks were launched on Police Stations in all areas of the island, save Jaffna. A state of emergency was declared as was a Curfew in the districts of Amparai, Moneragala, Kandy, Badulla and Nuwara Eliya. The next day the Curfew was extended over the whole island, and continued in force, with progressive relaxation, for the rest of the year.
Taken completely by surprise, Police Stations were unprepared to deal with the attacks. Yet they fought back and, in some areas, brought JVP activities to a halt. However, a large number of Police Stations were abandoned and the JVP left as the “de facto” power locally. The government and the Armed Services were equally unprepared, as there was no operational plan that could be immediately activated in such an eventuality. Soon, however, the Services and Police were able to counter attack successfully, having quickly learnt the JVP’s strategy and its weaknesses. The insurgents even attempted an attack on the U.S.Embassy, which resulted in the death of a brave Police Officer. The government’s reaction was quick, resolute and determined. The Embassy of a country suspected of supporting the insurgents was closed down and JVP cadres were called upon to lay down their arms and surrender. A large number of Detention camps were established where surrenderees were questioned and sorted out. Within two months the movement had been defeated, save for a small group that took refuge in the forests.
Immediate Impact on the Navy
The Navy was below its approved cadre and complement of 165 officers and 1820 sailors by the end of 1970. An increase in approved numbers to 175 officers and 2100 sailors was expected momentarily and recruitment had begun. The introduction of Defence Ministry Security screening, in addition to routine Police and C.I.D. screening, however, led to a delay in actual enlistment and training. The new screening was not, initially, considered necessary but events speedily proved that it was. When the first attack came, the Navy was yet short by several hundred and it was decided that one hundred be enlisted without prior screening, provided their backgrounds could be vouched for by someone responsible and within the Navy. This intake was recruited under unique conditions: all those summoned had to be “security screened” by a special team seated in the Recruiting Centre. When the telegrams summoning the selectees were sent out, official requests came from certain Military Co-ordinating officers to arrest some of them upon arrival, as they were “wanted”; the telegrams sent to a few were returned by the Post Masters with the notation “Regret addressee dead in fight with Army”. Those selected were put into Action Working Dress (AWDs), given half-an-hour of drill, loaded into buses and sent with an escort party to Trincomalee along a major highway that was practically empty. On the way, the Police were engaging the terrorists at Habarana: the Recruits were instructed to remain in the bus and the escort joined the Police in the action. These Recruits (who soon earned the name “The Hundred Rifles”) were given basic infantry and weapon training only and sent to operational areas. The same policy was followed in the VNF which was to used as a filter for would-be regulars: the regulars would be picked from the VNF after a year or so of experience, during which time they would be evaluated in the field. A team from the Recruiting Office interviewed the applicants at the sites where they were serving, in different parts of the country. Several other intakes followed, but these were selected in accordance with Ministry requirements.
At the very beginning, the shortage of personnel led to crew of “Gajabahu” being taken off for shore duty. This meant that the Navy had no offensive capability afloat at a time when there was a widespread belief that the insurgents were being supplied with arms and ammunition by sea. The sudden and unannounced arrival of a Chinese ship in harbour, with a large number of army personnel on board, and a Master who was unwilling to divulge details of where she was going and why she was carrying so many soldiers, made it necessary for “Gajabahu” to put to sea again. However, the government appealed for help to all friendly countries and help was forthcoming from a great many. Indian and Pakistani Navy ships, with SLN officers on board, undertook to patrol our waters to supplement “Gajabahu”. Other forms of support from many sources came, and the non-alligned stance that the government had adopted many years previously proved itself. Among the many countries that extended support were the U.K., U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.
A much more serious danger to the Armed Services came with the discovery that the JVP had infiltrated all of them. This was discovered after the attacks had begun and the infiltrators had even taken part in operations. Soon the identify of the leaders were discovered and orders were given by the Ministry of Defence to arrest them. The suspect sailors realized that their days were numbered and one sailor who was armed at the time, opened fire at the unarmed sailors who came to ask him to report to the Commanding officer on his return from duty at Chunnakam Power Station. In this incident, two sailors were killed – PO C.A.Gunasekera, A 321 and L/EM n.T.J.Costa, B 2010 – and others seriously injured. The JVP sympathizers made a get-away, carrying all arms, with a civilian driver taken along at gun-point, and tried to leave the Jaffna peninsula. However, they were intercepted at Elephant Pass and, in the resulting exchange of fire, all of them lost their lives. This led to much investigation and several other sailors were arrested on suspicion and questioned. The scenario was much the same in the Army and Air Force and several were arrested. Later, a large number of those who were considered “hard-core” insurgents were taken on board “Gajabahu” to Fort Hammenheil, Kayts, which was made a maximum security detention centre. The first sailor to lose his life in a battle situation with insurgents, however, was E/M D.C.A.Cader, B2400 who succumbed to his injuries in Anuradhapura hospital, after being hit in cross-fire at Nochchiyagama.
In spite of the shortage of personnel, the Navy undertook the security of areas in the island that the Police could not control alone. Naval Co-ordinating Officers were appointed: Cdr.A.H.A.de Silva to Polonnaruwa, Capt.H.Molegoda, VNF, to Ratnapura and Cdr(E) D.A.G.Fernando to Amparai.
Naval detachments were opended at Tangalle, Habarana, Bakamuna, Kalpitiya and Kekirawa. Naval personnel began to take part in offensive actions on land and helped wipe out the JVP hold on Polonnaruwa, Maho and in the south by carefully planned operations. Sailors who proved themselves in these were recognized by a system of battle-field promotions that were introduced for the first time.
Consequential Impact
The country lost its standing as a country without internal conflicts and, because of its strategic location, and the perception that the Insurgency was Marxist in character, many Embassies and High Commissions in Colombo added Military Attaches to their staffs. India was the first and others were Pakistan, the U.K., U.S.A., Indonesia, France, and the U.S.S.R. Many of these countries had come to the aid of the country during the Insurgency and either provided equipment, advisors and services or had pledged to do so, and they felt it was in their own interests to monitor the situation regularly. The Insurgency thus catapulted Sri Lanka into a different category of country, in terms of global polities, than before.
The Fleet
A major impact of the Insurgency on the Navy was that it showed up the weakness of the Navy at sea. Policy changes resulted in a commendably short time and the Navy was soon in the market for craft with ability to fight at sea. The first acquisitions came in the form of a gift from the Peoples’ Republic of China. This took the form of two re-conditioned “Shanghai” class Fast Gun Boats (FGB) which were commissioned as SLNS “Sooraya” and SLNS “Weeraya” on 22.2.72. The craft were much bigger than the Patrol Craft and had a considerable array of armament. Being found suitable for the purpose, in the following year three more new craft of the same type were purchased and named “Ranakamie”, “Dakshaya” and “Balawatha”. Later, in 1980, two more, “Rakshaya” and “Jagatha” were purchased and commissioned.
The USSR also gifted a Fast Attack Craft, after a SLN crew was given a year’s training and familiarization with similar craft in that country. Patrol Boat 451 ET 205 was commissioned SLNS “Samudra Devi” on 31.12.75 with Cdr.H.A.Silva in command. This was a very sophisticated ship, originally designed for missile warfare but was modified as required, with the addition of a gun in the fo’c’sle as the main armament in place of missiles.
In the following years, “Seruwa” and “Korawakka”, the first of five general duties Patrol craft ordered from Cheverton Workboats, U.K., were commissioned.
The Colombo Dockyard entered the scene as a possible builder of Patrol Craft for the Navy, and the first was launched on 8.6.76. In 1980, an order was placed for five Coastal Patrol Craft and the first was taken delivery of. Orders were placed for four more of a different type and one taken delivery of. In 1983, the first 40-metre Patrol craft built was launched and the first Off-shore Patrol Craft taken delivery of and commissioned on Navy Day as SLNS “Jayesagara”.
Colombo Dockyard also constructed Vessel Yard No.41 for the use of the Navy.
These acquisitions changed the character of the Fleet considerably. However, since the insurgency had been successfully put down, it was considered that “Samudradevi” and the seven Fast Gun Boats provided sufficient attack capability.
The ships and craft were kept in a constant state of readiness. Those requiring major refit or repair were temporarily de-commissioned and later re-commissioned. As early as 1971, communications in Sinhala had been introduced between ships using voice communication systems only.
In 1980, exercises at sea off Jaffna were conducted, with the Commander of the Navy joining the fleet for a part of the exercise.
Cruises
Cruises to neighbouring countries were undertaken to give ships’ crews experience of longer periods and of evolutions at sea.
In December, 1973, “Balawatha” and “Dakshaya” left on the a goodwill cruise to the Maldives. This was the first cruise undertaken since the ill-starred Far Eastern cruise. In February of the following year the Commander of the Navy, paid a ceremonial visit there, flying his flag on the “Gajabahu”. In August the same year, the Prime Minister visited the Maldives and “Gajabahu” was again there in connection with the visit. A direct result of this visit was that two Maldivian cadets were offered training by the Navy, and arrived shortly after.
In 1976, “Gajabahu” sailed to Cochin on an operational visit, and “Sooraya” and “Ranakami” sailed on a similar mission to the Maldives. “Gajabahu” also sailed to Madras on several occasions to transport ammunition and to give sea-time to sailors on non-sea-going branches of the Navy.
In 1978, “ Balawatha” and “Weeraya” visited the Maldives.
In 1981 “Gajabahu” visited the Maldives.
New Bases and new duties
During the Insurgency, a detachment had been established in Tangalle and this was commissioned as SLNS “Ruhuna”, on 17.12.71 with Lt.Cdr.F.N.Q.Wickremaratne in command.
The detachment at Kalpitiya was also commissioned as SLNS “Vijaya” under the command of Lt.Cdr.A.Wijetilleke, on 1.6.73.
A new detachment was opened in Talaimannar under Lt.S.D.Munasinghe and another at Laxapana. The facilities for slipping at Galle, which the Fisheries Dept. had, were made available to the Navy.
The Navy also began assuming new tasks in keeping with its image of itself as the nation’s “reservoir of maritime skills”. On 6.6.71 the Ceylon Shipping Corporation (CSC) was formed, as anticipated, and the Navy played an important role in its formative years. As the CSC experienced manning difficulties initially, one ship was offered to be manned exclusively by the Navy. From 1975 to 1982, this facility was welcomed by the Navy as it offered officers and sailors the opportunity to experience “blue water” sailing, since their experience aboard naval vessels was limited cruises to the Maldives and South Indian ports, apart from coastal sailing. It also enabled them to gain experience in merchant shipping which helped a great many to quality themselves and find billets after retirement. The ship taken over was m.v.“Lanka Kanthi” which had Capt. A.H.A.de Silva as her first Master. Later, other coastal merchant ships were, such as “Mahaweli” and “Maduru Oya” were also crewed by the Navy.
In March 1976, the Lighthouses so far maintained by the Imperial Lighthouses Commission were handed over for maintenance by the Navy. These were the Barberyn, Dondra and Great Basses Lighthouses, and the vessel “Pradeepa” which was used to service the Great Basses Lighthouses from Kirinde.
Routine Operations
The Navy being on a heightened condition of alertness all routine operations were carried out with more attention to detail than normal.
There was, however, another cyclone that affected the east coast in 1978, Batticaloa, Amparai, Polonnaruwa and Mannar districts being the worst affected. Co-ordinating officers from the Services were appointed to be in charge of flood-relief work and Cdr.G.H.M.P.Elikewela was appointed to Polonnaruwa.
Ceremonial
On 9th December, 1971, the Navy celebrated the completion of 21 years since the Navy Act was passed. The emphasis was on religious observances and "Pirith" was chanted at the Colombo Wardroom a "Pooja" held at the Sivam Temple, Kochchikade, Prayers at the Maradana Mosque and a Christian Service at Christ Church, Fort. Later in the evening, a Ceremonial “Beating of the Retreat” was held at Sugathadasa Stadium, with the Prime Minister taking the salute.
The first anniversary of the declaration of the Republic was held on 22nd May, 1973. Apart from the detachment taking part in the Parade, “Gajabahu” and four Fast Gun Boats also performed maneuvers off Galle Face.
During the Prime Minister’s visit to Trincomalee, on 31.5.74, she unveiled a plaque commemorating the take-over of the Base from the R.N.
On 9th December, 1975, the Navy celebrated its Silver Jubilee. At an impressive ceremony at the Sugathadasa Stadium, H.E. the President William Gopallawa presented his colours to the Navy. He also awarded the 25th Anniversary Commemorative Medals to officers and sailors who had completed 25 years of service. For the benefit of the public, a Silver Jubilee Exhibition was held at Boy Scouts’ Headquarters over several days. A sit-down dinner where the Prime Minister was the Chief Guest was held at Galle Face Hotel.
At National level, the most significant event was the holding of the Fifth Non-Aligned Nations’ Summit Conference at the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall (BMICH) under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister Sirimavo R.D. Bandaranaike. The Navy made available many officers for liaison work and undertook many ceremonial, security, logistic and support services.
In January, 1978, H.E.William Gopallawa completed his term as President and hosted the Commander of the Navy and his senior officers to tea at President’s House to say “Thank you and Farewell”. He was succeeded by H.E. J.R.Jayewardene. By this time the new Constitution had been passed and the new President was Chief Executive and Head of State.
The new National Flag Carrier airline, “Air Lanka”, was launched and the Navy Band was selected to go on a promotional tour. They performed with acclaim at London, Paris, Zurich, Bangkok and Singapore under Cdr. Danwatte, the Bandmaster.
The Royal Yacht “Brittania”, following Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II who came by air, visited Sri Lanka in 1981. The Navy paraded a Guard of Honour for the Queen.
The Commander of the Navy, Rear Adm. A.W.H.Perera was awarded the “Vishishta Seva Vibushana” (VSV) in 1981.
War clouds loom
By 1975, the signs were visible that a major Sinhala-Tamil clash would take place. Although Jaffna had remained an ocean of peace in 1971, the climate had been worsening. Tamil militant groups, some avowedly Marxist, had come into being but were yet jostling for power among themselves. The first major incident was the murder of the SLFP Mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappa, in 1975. This was, in effect, a watershed which marked the beginning of a new political era. Other communities were also involved: a Sinhala-Muslim clash in Galgamuwa, Maho and Puttalam was contained only by swift naval intervention. In the General Election of 1977, the Tamil parties represented in Parliament were willing to co-operate with the new government led by J.R.Jayewardena (initially as Prime Minister and later as Executive President) in a last-bid effort to solve the problem democratically and by concensus. It effort was destined to fail.
The Armed Services prepared themselves for a struggle and it was decided that a Joint Command be set up. On a Presidential directive on 15th October, 1983, there was formed an organization comprising the Army, Navy, Air Force, Police and Pulbic Service, to co-ordinate anti-terrorist activities in the districts of Vavuniya, Mannar, Mullaitivu and Trincomalee. Titled “Joint Services Special Operations Command” (JOSSOP), the Commander of the Navy, Rear Adm.A.H.A.de Silva, was appointed Co-ordinator-in-chief (in addition to his substantive post) with J.Bandaragoda of the SLAS as Deputy. JOSSOP was to operate from Vavuniya and set up its headquarters there.
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